SEFER CHOFETZ CHAIM Afterword: Shidduchim Situations (continued)
Having informed us in strong terms what we are not permitted to relate when providing information concerning a shidduch, the Chofetz Chaim now discusses negative information which should be related. At times we must remain silent, in keeping with the commandment, “Do not go as a peddler of gossip among your people” (Vayikra 19:16), while at other times we must speak up, in keeping with the end of that same verse, “You shall not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is shed.”
If a shidduch is being considered and one is aware that either the young man or woman has a serious flaw of which the other party is unaware, then it must be reported.
For example, if either a young man or woman has a serious hidden medical problem, or is lacking in basic religious observance, these facts must be told. Of course, the conditions for speaking loshon hora l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) must be fulfilled; the speaker must be certain that the information is accurate, that he is not exaggerating the flaw in any way, and that he is reporting the information for a constructive reason and not because he has a personal interest in seeing this shidduch proposal rejected.
The Chofetz Chaim cautions us not to offer negative information about a young man’s level of Torah knowledge. There is no universal standard by which to judge someone’s Torah knowledge. If the girl’s family considers a high level of learning a priority, then there are ways by which they can determine the boy’s level without others having to come forward and offer their opinions. If they did not take these steps, then we can assume that the matter is not such a priority to them. One would, therefore, be guilty of loshon hora if he were to offer such information.
If one knows that the home of either party is one of pritzus (low moral standards), this must be reported. But, says the Chofetz Chaim, this is true only if there is a reasonable chance that the information will be taken seriously and the shidduch will be rejected. Otherwise, such information will be used after the marriage as “ammunition” when problems develop (and, assuming the information is true, they probably will develop). In such a case, reporting the information will only serve to cause rechilus to be spoken.
SEFER CHOFETZ CHAIM Afterword: Shidduchim Situations
The Chofetz Chaim devotes the remainder of his sefer to the topic of shidduchim (marriage matches).
If we were to look at the Torah as a kind of “Manufacturer’s Manual” for how to conduct ourselves in this world in which our Creator has placed us, we would find the power of speech under a chapter entitled “Dangerous Material — Handle with Care.” In no area would this title be more appropriate than in the area of shidduchim. The information which we provide to a party who is considering someone else as a marriage partner for himself or for his child may well determine that person’s decision. Thus, such information may affect the lives of both parties for eternity. The Chofetz Chaim notes that his initial guidelines in this area are so obvious that they should not have to be stated. Nevertheless, he states them, “because of the terrible results which come [from ignoring these guidelines] — and [ignoring them] is perfectly correct to many people. Therefore, I have been forced to explain the great treachery of the baalei loshon hora in this matter. Perhaps through this, Hashem will help to remove some of the intense blindness in this area.”
The Chofetz Chaim has very strong words for those who have the practice of labeling people with derogatory descriptions which have no basis. Labeling is an easy way of showing a complete understanding of someone’s personality when in fact the assessment may be far off the mark.
The Chofetz Chaim offers the example of a young man who is intelligent, but his sincere, innocent nature makes it difficult for him to recognize the shrewd, crafty dealings of others. Or, his spiritual level places him above taking part in the exchange of jokes or verbal fencing which his cynical acquaintances seem to enjoy so much. When an inquiring party seeks information about the young man, they are told, “He’s a nice boy, but not that bright.” Naturally, the party immediately loses interest. Because of this labeling, the young man endures many rejections from potential partners.
The Chofetz Chaim has extremely harsh words for loose-tongued cynics who carelessly offer such false assessments. He applies to them the verse, “May Hashem cut off all lips of smooth talk, the tongue which speaks boastfully” (Tehillim 12:4). The Chofetz Chaim deems these individuals baalei motzi’ei shem ra, those who habitually speak slander, since they give false information about others. They are also guilty of causing others to sin, because they create the impression that to be considered “successful” one needs to demonstrate a quick wit. In fact, those who regularly engage in “quick-witted” conversation often are guilty of transgressing the laws of shmiras haloshon (guarding one’s tongue).
The best way to deal with such people, says the Chofetz Chaim, is to stay far away from them.
This segment concludes with the Chofetz Chaim cautioning us that when asked information concerning a shidduch, we are not to offer negative information about the party’s ancestors. What is important is the person, not his or her family tree.
SEFER CHOFETZ CHAIM Afterword: Business Situations (continued)
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim teaches us an important rule concerning giving advice.
Shimon is seeking a partner with whom to start a business. He sets his eye upon Levi, who has a reputation as an aggressive, energetic businessman. Shimon does not know Levi personally, but his friend Reuven knows Levi well. In a conversation with Reuven one day, Shimon mentions his consideration of Levi as a partner.
Reuven cannot believe it! His friend Levi has been unemployed for six months and is desperately trying to earn some money. Reuven had promised to help him find a job. And now the opportunity has fallen right into his lap!
But there is something else that Reuven knows. Levi has been borrowing thousands of dollars and has yet to pay back a cent. His situation is becoming desperate, and therefore it is quite possible that he is prepared to make some risky investments to try and earn a quick, sizeable profit and pay off some of his debts. In his heart, Reuven knows the truth: he would not take Levi as a partner in his own business at the present time.
The Chofetz Chaim informs us that there is a vast difference between withholding negative information about someone and offering advice which ignores such information. In our example, if Reuven were to hear that Shimon is preparing to enter into a partnership with Levi, it might be forbidden for him to approach Shimon and inform him that he considers the partnership a risk. He has no proof that Levi is going to do business recklessly; Reuven’s concerns are based merely on his assessment of Levi’s situation. For him to discourage Shimon because of this may very well be forbidden. On the other hand, for Reuven to ignore such information and instead use his conversation with Shimon as an opportunity to encourage Shimon to enter into the partnership would be a transgression of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Vayikra 19:14), which prohibits us from intentionally offering bad advice.
The Chofetz Chaim bemoans the fact that some people offer such advice because they are blinded by financial considerations. For example, Reuven may be one of Levi’s creditors. He wants to see Levi earn some money so that Levi will pay his debts. It is in such situations that Reuven must be honest with himself and not offer advice that he knows is not in Shimon’s best interests. The same would apply in the area of shidduchim (marriage matches) and other types of relationships.
SEFER CHOFETZ CHAIM Afterword: Business Situations
In this segment we are introduced to Shimon, a reckless businessman with an appetite for risk — especially when the money which he is investing is not his own.
One day, Levi opens the newspaper and comes across an article about rumors concerning a lucrative business partnership between Reuven and Shimon. Levi is dismayed; Reuven is quite wealthy and Shimon is sure to make good use of his partner’s money.
There is no question, says the Chofetz Chaim, that Levi is obligated to warn Reuven of the dangers of such a partnership (provided that the conditions of toeles have been fulfilled).
This applies if the partnership has not yet been finalized. If, on the other hand, Levi learns of the partnership after it is already a reality, then the halachah is different. As we have already learned, it is forbidden to provide someone with information which would cause him to take action which is not sanctioned by halachah. Once a partnership exists, it is not a simple matter to dissolve it. Shimon may suffer a loss from the break-up and a beis din (rabbinical court) might rule that Reuven cannot dissolve the partnership without offering compensation. The fact that in the past Shimon has made some reckless deals may not be sufficient grounds for dissolution. Furthermore, in a court of law, Levi could not testify as a single witness. Even if he had a supporting witness with him, he would have to present his case before a beis din for Reuven to take action. Therefore, Levi cannot relate his concerns to Reuven if he will react by immediately dissolving the partnership.
On the other hand, if by warning Reuven the result will be that Reuven will remain in the partnership but will be on guard to make sure that his money is used wisely, then Levi should inform him.
The Chofetz Chaim also discusses a case where Shimon is not a reckless businessman, but one who has fallen on hard times. He had been successful in the past, but now has suffered some major reversals. Reuven, his prospective partner, is unaware of this, but Levi knows all about it. The Chofetz Chaim addresses Levi. “Beware, my brother,’’ he warns him. To relate such information would be, in the Chofetz Chaim’s words, “a great sin.” We are speaking where there is no evidence that Shimon’s losses had anything to do with recklessness or poor judgment. It was simply a matter of things not going his way. Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, there is every reason to believe that Hashem will now take pity on him so that he can succeed as he did in the past. Furthermore, assisting someone so that he can succeed at earning a livelihood and not have to live off community donations is actually the highest form of tzedakah (charity). And one never loses from an act of tzedakah (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 247:2).
This segment opens with a situation where a friend confronts us: “Someone used my calculator and left it on — tell me who it was!” Revealing the culprit’s identity would be rechilus. One is permitted to say, “It wasn’t me.”
However, this would not be the case where one is present at a private board meeting where the majority voted not to renew Mr. Stein’s contract as synagogue custodian. If Mr. Stein confronts one of the board members and demands to know, “Did you vote against me?” it would be forbidden to respond in any way other than to say, “The discussion at the meeting is a private matter and I am not at liberty to reveal its contents.” This applies even when one actually voted in favor of Mr. Stein and strongly disagrees with the majority decision.
The Chofetz Chaim offers us a real-life situation which often leads to rechilus.
Reuven, who sells Judaica, has received a few rare portraits by a renowned artist. Shimon passes by the store and, seeing the portraits in the window, enters Reuven’s store and negotiates a price for one of the paintings. He tells Reuven, “I left my checkbook at home. Please put this painting aside until I return this evening.” Reuven agrees.
When Shimon returns that evening, he is dismayed to learn that the painting has been sold to Levi! Reuven attempts to excuse himself. “What could I do? Levi desperately wanted that painting. I told him that I had already agreed to sell it to you, but he didn’t care. In fact, he didn’t even give me a choice in the matter. He just put the money on the table and took the painting! Perhaps, had I really tried, I could have grabbed the painting back. But I didn’t want to get into a fight with him — I’m sure you understand!”
If Reuven’s account of what transpired between Levi and himself is accurate, then he is guilty of speaking rechilus. There is nothing constructive to be gained from telling Shimon that Levi is to blame. The sale to Levi is valid; Reuven does not dispute that. Telling the details to Shimon will only serve to cause him to be angry with Levi.
The Chofetz Chaim notes that all too often in such situations, Reuven’s account is merely a cover-up for the real story: Levi has come and offered a better price, or he is a close friend of Reuven, and therefore Reuven is eager to benefit him. Reuven has not even informed Levi that he has already agreed to sell the painting. When Shimon comes along and demands an explanation, Reuven contrives a story so that Levi is blamed and Reuven appears innocent. If this is the situation, then Reuven is guilty of the more severe sin of hotza’as shem ra (slander).
The Chofetz Chaim offers one final word of caution: Sometimes, Reuven is honest and places the blame squarely on his own shoulders. “I’m sorry,” he says, “It was my fault. Someone came along with a better offer and I sold it to him without informing him that I had a verbal understanding with you.” Even then, Reuven should not reveal the identity of the purchaser, for it is possible that Shimon will harbor some ill will towards Levi, despite the fact that he was totally innocent of any wrongdoing.
This concludes the laws of rechilus. In the remaining segments, the Chofetz Chaim offers important illustrations relating to various concepts in shmiras haloshon (guarding one’s tongue).
Righteous indignation is a feeling which nearly everyone experiences at some point in time. While it stems from the sense that truth and justice are on our side, the reality may be precisely the opposite. In a dispute over money, even a businessman who carefully adheres to the Torah’s business ethics in most situations may veer off track. He might find justification for his actions and say, “Since I’ve been cheated, I will never pay the balance that I owe.”
Often, says the Chofetz Chaim, the rationalizations which lead a person to take the law into his own hands are the results of rechilus. An example is when Reuven sees Shimon overpay for an item at a particular store. Though Shimon has already purchased the item, Reuven tells him, “You know, you could have gotten that for much less at the discount outlet.” Shimon now decides to remedy the situation himself, without consulting a beis din (rabbinical court). He withholds the money which he owes the storekeeper on the theory that he is only keeping what is rightfully his own. Of course, he is wrong. As we learned in the previous segment, there are times when a beis din will not force the storekeeper to refund the amount which was overcharged. In any case, one has no right to withhold payment without the authorization of beis din.
For advice about a purchase to be considered toeless (constructive), there must be a reasonable possibility that it will serve a constructive purpose. If no constructive purpose will be achieved, then the advice can only lead to a dispute between the buyer and the storekeeper. That, in turn, may lead to the type of unilateral actions which we have described. Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, we cannot inform someone that he has been cheated if it might lead him to withhold payment or try in some other way to cause the seller unwarranted loss.
The Chofetz Chaim comments, “Many people today stumble terribly in this area, offering their opinion to others regarding their purchases. Their friends ask them whether they paid a fair price and they respond, ‘He cheated you!’ ”
As the Chofetz Chaim explains at length, these people fail to foresee the consequences of what seems like the simple observation of a concerned friend. To make matters worse, they often incite the buyer by telling him, “Give back the merchandise! Tell him you can buy it cheaper somewhere else. If you’re embarrassed to do that, send someone else to him with the merchandise. And if he won’t take it back, don’t finish paying him what you owe.”
What are the consequences of this advice?
The advisor in this story has transgressed the negative commandments: “Do not go as a peddler of gossip” (Vayikra 19:16) and “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (ibid. v.14). The Chofetz Chaim focuses on another angle: Is the advisor correct that his friend was actually cheated? Did he study the merchandise well enough to know the makings of this particular product and its market price? Might there be many variations of quality, and therefore price variations, for this product? For instance, one can buy a vacuum cleaner for $150, or for $500. If one pays $500 for a top-of-the-line model, has he been cheated? In addition, observes the Chofetz Chaim, prices can change. Perhaps a certain item has become difficult to obtain, resulting in a price increase.
In the Chofetz Chaim’s illustration, the advisor has given no consideration to these factors. Because he acted without consideration of the halachah, he has enraged the buyer without cause. In all likelihood, the buyer will see no results from his complaint to the storekeeper, and will be left feeling cheated. The resulting conflict and hatred, says the Chofetz Chaim, are rooted in comments which never should have been voiced, even if the purchaser had sought his friend’s opinion. The Chofetz Chaim cautions people to ponder these factors and the relevant laws well before speaking up in such situations. “Then Hashem will assist him that no mishap will come about through him.”
In the previous segment, the Chofetz Chaim presented a case where one would be obligated to speak rechilus for a constructive purpose. A simpleton was on the verge of making a purchase from a shrewd, dishonest storekeeper. In such cases, one would be required to inform the person not to make the purchase.
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim takes the story one step further. The purchase has already been made and the customer has been cheated. Should the observer now go and inform the buyer that he’s been “taken for a ride”? On the surface, the answer would seem to be a resounding “Yes!” Why shouldn’t we let the man know that he has been victimized so that he can demand a refund?
The answer to this is that in certain instances, the man cannot legally demand a refund. For example, the laws of ona’ah (fraud) call for a refund only when the buyer has been overcharged an amount equal to one-sixth of the item’s true value. If the amount is less than one-sixth of the item’s value, the seller cannot be forced to refund the money. (Since the amount is small and most people would not make a claim to recover it, the wronged party is assumed to have relinquished his claim to it — see Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:3). In this case, as well as other cases where Halachah does not call for a refund, it would be forbidden to tell the buyer that he had been cheated, for no constructive purpose would be served.
The Chofetz Chaim says more.
If the buyer asks us whether we think he was cheated, we are not allowed to tell him the truth, for this would cause strife and is therefore considered rechilus. To the contrary, says the Chofetz Chaim; in such a case it would be a mitzvah to praise the transaction and tell the buyer that he did well with his purchase. The Chofetz Chaim assures us that the command “Distance yourself from falsehood” (Shemos 23:7) does not apply here. As we have already explained (Day 92), preserving peace is a form of truth, while spreading animosity is equated with falsehood.
The Chofetz Chaim also points out a case where the amount which the buyer was overcharged is refundable in beis din, but nevertheless it is questionable whether the victim can be told that he was overcharged. This is where the buyer is known to have a loose tongue. He is liable to tell the storekeeper “And if you want to know how I figured out that you swindled me — it was Shimon who told me!” In this case, by informing him that he was cheated, we would be causing him to speak rechilus.
This, in fact, is a very likely possibility. In confronting the storekeeper and making his case, Reuven’s natural tendency would be to draw upon all his evidence, including the identity of his informer. Nevertheless, he would be wrong for doing so.
We know how seriously the Torah views fraud. It is seen, not as a small indiscretion, but as something which destroys the world. Nevertheless, the need to expose fraud does not grant us a license to cause another Jew to sin and to cause strife among the Jewish people.
Because it is so easy to err in the area of constructive speech, the Chofetz Chaim saw fit to offer the following illustration and expound upon it:
You are walking down a street in your city and you see Reuven about to enter a certain store. Reuven is a simpleton, a somewhat naïve fellow who is not alert to the schemes of crooked individuals. The storekeeper, on the other hand, is a shrewd fellow who has little trouble fooling people like Reuven with shoddy merchandise, inflated prices and dishonest weights.
In such a situation, says the Chofetz Chaim, you are obligated to warn Reuven not to enter the store. If he has already entered, advise him to leave as quickly as possible.
The same would apply if you see that Reuven has already agreed to a purchase in which he will be cheated. For instance, the storekeeper tells Reuven that a new jacket, which is on sale at a great price reduction, is a popular brand name. You happen to know that the item is actually a poor imitation of the brand name. Or, the storekeeper tells Reuven that the coat he is about to purchase is on sale for $400, but you know that the same coat is selling everywhere else for $315.
In such cases you must warn Reuven that he is about to be cheated. Of course, before doing so, you must fulfill the five requirements of rechilus l’toeles. Once again, these requirements are:
1. You must be certain that your information about the storekeeper is correct.
2. You may not exaggerate the storekeeper’s faults.
3. Your intent must be l’toeles, for a constructive purpose and not because you happen to dislike t his particular storekeeper.
4. You must be certain that there is no way to convince Reuven to avoid this purchase without telling him the faults of the storekeeper.
5. You will not cause the storekeeper a loss which is not permitted by Halachah (Torah law). If your warning Reuven will result in a major scandal which will force the storekeeper to leave town or close his business, then you must remain silent.
A competent halachic authority should be consulted regarding how best to prevent further fraud.
If we take a hard look at the missteps and blunders we make in life, we will find one common denominator in most of these actions: we always have support for what we do. This support helps us overcome objections or guilt by supplying an unending list of rationalizations to free us to pursue our agenda. The source of this support is the yetzer hara (evil inclination) which joins us at birth and remains a challenge, for us to overcome until our last moment on this world.
A situation in which we should be on guard, says the Chofetz Chaim, is where we know that someone has been guilty of thievery or some other form of monetary dishonesty. If the victim is someone who is close to us, then there is a strong natural urge to inform the person of what happened and to let him know the identity of the perpetrator. However, as we have learned, we can only relate such information for a constructive purpose, and only after fulfilling the necessary conditions. If the victim cannot retrieve his money and it is clear that the crime was a “one-shot deal” and will not be repeated, then to tell the victim what happened would be to commit the sin of speaking rechilus.
The Chofetz Chaim also reminds us that we cannot relate such information even when our friend, the victim, pressures us to do so. “I know exactly what happened,” he might tell us. “Just tell me who did it.” Our yetzer hara may tell us that by remaining silent we will be risking this friendship. In truth, however, a genuine friend who really cares about the other person will not allow him to become entangled in sin, even if he will be angry because of this. Friendships are based on giving and there can be no greater gift than the gift of eternity.
In a previous segment (Day 115) we listed five conditions which must be fulfilled before we can relate rechilus for a constructive purpose.
The fifth condition was that the recipient of the information will use it for a defensive purpose and not to punish the subject of the gossip with unwarranted harm. Examining this requirement further, the Chofetz Chaim says that the allowance for telling someone constructive gossip depends heavily on how the recipient of the information is likely to handle it.
The halachah requires us to take stock of this person’s mind and character. We must ask ourselves: Is this a thoughtful person who does his best to act within the guidelines of Jewish law? Or is this a hotheaded individual who will act before he thinks? If we know that this person will thoughtfully consult a rav (rabbi) or beis din (rabbinical court) on how to conduct himself in light of the new information he has received, then we can tell him the information. If, on the other hand, we suspect that he may react first and ask questions later, we are not allowed to reveal the information.
The reason why Halachah does not allow the subject of constructive rechilus to sustain undue damage relates to the laws of witnesses and testimony. When someone repeats information for a constructive purpose, he is actually acting as a single witness. But a beis din will disregard the testimony of a single witness — the Torah requires a minimum of two witnesses for testimony in court to be accepted. Therefore, a beis din would not impose damages on a defendant against whom there is only one witness. If a beis din cannot impose damages against this person, then certainly the recipient of constructive rechilus cannot do so! The consequences of someone speaking constructive rechilus cannot exceed that which would have been extracted by a beis din. The information of a single witness can, however, be used for protective purposes.
What if two people want to inform the potential victim of someone’s plans against him? After analyzing the issue, the Chofetz Chaim rules that here, too, they should not relate the information to someone who is likely to take matters into his own hands and inflict damage upon the victim. This applies even when it appears to the two witnesses that would the victim go to beis din, he would receive authorization for his actions. As the Chofetz Chaim explains, the witnesses cannot assess what beis din would have done because in all probability they are not knowledgeable enough in the relevant laws to know how beis din would have judged.
Furthermore, even if the witnesses were certain that damage was called for, the potential victim would not be permitted to take action without the witnesses testifying in beis din. By relating the information outside of beis din, the witnesses are actually aiding a sinner whom, they know, will take the law into his own hands. The question remains as to what can be done for the person who cannot be trusted to handle constructive gossip? How do we protect him from damage if the Torah prohibits us from giving him the information? The answer is that by remaining silent we are helping him, for he stands to incur greater harm if he uses the information incorrectly. To those who observe this halachah and remain silent in such a situation, the Chofetz Chaim applies the verse, “One who guards his mouth and his tongue, guards his soul from troubles” (Mishlei 21:23).
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim offers an example of a person whom you heard plotting to harm or embarrass someone. Certainly if the threat is serious then it must be reported, for there is a clear constructive purpose in warning the person. But if the person who spoke was just venting his anger with no intention of following through on his threat, then there is no constructive purpose. To the contrary, the report will only infuriate the subject and cause more animosity between him and the person who spoke against him.
To judge whether or not there is a constructive purpose in relating rechilus, one needs to carefully examine the situation and use a generous dose of common sense. The Chofetz Chaim offers some criteria for assessing the seriousness of any threats we may hear. The first is to know the person making the threat. Has he taken revenge on others in the past? Is he known to carry out his threats? Has he ever done before what he now claims he is planning to do? If after sizing up the situation the threat seems credible, then the information must be reported to the potential victim, assuming the conditions of toeles (constructive purpose) have been fulfilled.
The Chofetz Chaim cautions us that our first step should be to attempt to reprove the person who made the threat in the hope that this will convince him to retract it. If the situation can be resolved with that one step, it will not be necessary to warn the potential victim and disrupt the relationship. However, one need not reprove in a case where it seems obvious that the person will ignore reproof.
The Chofetz Chaim further cautions us that before reporting to the potential victim, one should try to assess what his reaction will be. If he will react by taking steps to protect himself, or by avoiding his attacker entirely, then he should be forewarned. But if his reaction will be to become enraged and confront the other person, resulting in a full-scale feud, then it would be best to remain silent on the matter.
In general, much common sense is required to decide when a negative comment should be repeated.
We now begin the concluding chapter of Sefer Chofetz Chaim. In his introduction to the chapter, the Chofetz Chaim writes, “In this chapter, we will explain when it is actually correct to speak rechilus, in cases where the speaker’s intention is to save the person from damage. I ask of Hashem that I should not stumble in a matter of halachah.”
If the Chofetz Chaim found it necessary to offer a prayer at this point, then surely we should handle such situations with the utmost care. We can liken this to a situation where someone faces the possibility of undergoing major surgery. The person would surely ask for a second, expert opinion before making any decisions. Likewise, when our spiritual welfare is threatened by the possibility of stumbling in matters of loshon hora and rechilus, seeking advice of a halachic authority is strongly recommended.
With these caveats, let us examine the following case:
You learn that your friend is in the process of hiring a particular contractor for repairs on his house. You know that this contractor is not to be trusted. You are familiar with cases in which he has repeatedly changed his price, used inferior material, and demanded additional money to finish the job. The Chofetz Chaim states that you must warn your friend, provided that you can fulfill the following five conditions: *
1. Do not jump to conclusions.
All of us have had the experience of having our assumptions soundly disproved upon gaining more information. Before you say something that will cause this contractor a loss of income, you must check your facts and be certain that they show the contractor to be untrustworthy.
2. Do not exaggerate.
Do not use any terms or expressions which will make the fellow appear worse than he actually is. Though you may think that you need to exaggerate so that your friend will take you seriously, it is forbidden nonetheless.
3. Be sure that your only intention is to accomplish something constructive. If you yourself had a bad experience with this contractor and you still harbor some ill will towards him, you should not be the one to tell your friend about his dishonesty. In such a case, it would be wise to seek the counsel of a rav (rabbi) to decide how your friend should be warned.
Furthermore, you must be sure that your friend will not turn the information into rechilus by repeating it to the contractor. As the Chofetz Chaim explains, if it is unlikely that your friend will heed your warning not to use the contractor, then you should not warn him. This is especially true if it is likely that when things do not go as planned, your friend will lose his temper and tell the contractor, “My friend Reuven was right in telling me not to use you!” If that happens, your friend would be guilty of speaking rechilus and you would be guilty of causing a Jew to sin.
4. Seek other alternatives.
If there is any way that you can get your friend not to use this contractor without relating the negative information, then that is what you must do. For example, you might recommend a less expensive contractor, whom your friend would probably want to use.
5. Carefully consider the impact of your words.
In our example, the result of your words should be that the contractor is not hired by this particular customer. However, if the contractor’s business might be ruined, the information cannot be shared. For instance, if your friend owned a newspaper and would publish this information in a consumer advice column, or if he might use some other means which would have a severe impact on the contractor’s livelihood, then it is forbidden to relate the information.
A competent halachic authority should be consulted regarding how best to prevent further fraud.
The wisdom of the Torah is plainly apparent in these laws. The Torah recognizes the need to warn a friend about potential harm. Yet it also encompasses an awareness that businesses and professional careers can be destroyed by mistaken assumptions or competitor’s gossip. The laws of relating rechilus for a constructive purpose are precisely designed so that we can walk the thin line between helpful information and destructive gossip.
In Hilchos Loshon Hora we mentioned seven conditions. Here, only five are mentioned. In Be’er Mayim Chaim (laws of rechilus 9:9), the Chofetz Chaim explains why two of the conditions are omitted.
It is forbidden to tell a person a remark which was made about him, if that remark will cause him to be even slightly upset — though it contains nothing which is actually derogatory. Relating such remarks falls under the category of avak rechilus.
As proof of this law, the Chofetz Chaim (in Be’er Mayim Chaim) cites the famous incident involving Avraham and Sarah (cited above in Day 92). When the angels, who were disguised as wayfarers, informed Avraham that in a year hence he and his wife would be blessed with a child, Sarah (who stood listening at the doorway of the tent) laughed incredulously. “After I have withered shall I again have delicate skin? And my husband [too] is old!” (Bereishis 18:12). Hashem was displeased with this response (see Ramban ad loc.) and demanded of Avraham, “Why is it that Sarah laughed, saying, ‘Shall I in truth bear a child though I have aged?’” For the sake of peace between husband and wife, Hashem did not tell Avraham that Sarah had mentioned that he, too, was old.
Let us ponder this for a moment. At the time of this incident, Avraham was ninety-nine years old. Sarah was certainly not saying something derogatory when she referred to her husband as “old.” But the relationship between husband and wife is a very delicate one. Hashem, in His infinite wisdom, determined that even someone as great as Avraham Avinu (our Forefather) might feel slightly hurt upon learning that his wife referred to him as “old.” Therefore, Hashem omitted this part of Sarah’s remark when confronting Avraham.
The Chofetz Chaim concludes this chapter by cautioning us not to reveal private information which has been told to us in confidence. While revealing secrets is not necessarily in the category of speaking rechilus, it does cause harm to the person who confided in us. Furthermore, says the Chofetz Chaim, one who reveals secrets steps beyond the bounds of tznius (privacy and modesty) and goes against the wishes of the other person, which in itself is wrong.
In this segment, we begin learning the laws of avak rechilus (the “dust” of rechilus); statements which are not actual rechilus but which are nonetheless forbidden because they may cause ill will.
The first case is where Reuven tells Shimon, “You know, the other day someone asked Levi about you and he replied, ‘Oh, I think we’re best off not discussing him.’” Such a report indicates that Levi was hinting to something negative about Shimon.
The Chofetz Chaim’s second case is where mentioning someone’s generosity might cause the listener to be upset with him. For example, Levi tells Reuven, who is Shimon’s partner in a contracting firm, “Shimon is one of the nicest people I know. While you were away on vacation, he sent one of your best workers to help me with the porch I’m building — free of charge!” Reuven may not be very happy to hear that his partner is sharing their workers with others for free. To inform Reuven of this is to speak avak rechilus.
The third case is where Reuven’s business has scored some great successes and word of this spreads. A generous fellow, Reuven extends huge loans to help some friends get started in business. But when another friend comes who has a reputation of not paying his debts, Reuven is reluctant to help him. Some time later, this friend is discussing his plight with someone who exclaims, “Reuven didn’t help you with a loan? I’m shocked! He lent me so much money when I started my business!” While the man meant no harm, he very possibly has caused his listener to be angry with Reuven. He is, therefore, guilty of speaking avak rechilus.
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim finds it necessary to once again discuss the matter of conversation between husband and wife. If someone tells a woman something derogatory about her husband, she may not repeat this to her husband. Obviously, the same would apply if someone tells a husband something negative about his wife. The consequences of not observing this halachah can be devastating. Many family battles have been started by a husband telling his wife what his mother or sister said about her, or by a wife mentioning a criticism which her parents voiced about her husband.
The Chofetz Chaim offers us an important observation: If someone willingly listens to and accepts rechilus from his wife, then he is actually sending his wife a subtle message that he is pleased when she shares such information with him. This will encourage her to report to him every time she hears something derogatory about him. Aside from the many transgressions involved with speaking and accepting rechilus, such situations ultimately lead to much distress, resentment and strife.
Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, a wise husband or wife, upon being told rechilus by his or her spouse, will make it perfectly clear that such talk is forbidden by the Torah and is neither a desired, nor constructive, feature in a Jewish home.”
If Shimon tells Reuven’s wife that Levi spoke negatively of Reuven, Shimon has committed an act of rechilus. Though he has not repeated the story to Reuven himself, there is no doubt that Reuven’s wife will bear animosity towards Levi for having denigrated her husband. The Chofetz Chaim expands this concept to include all relatives, based on the assumption that relatives are protective of one another, and feel personally hurt when one of their members is attacked.
In the above case, had Shimon related the information to someone outside of Reuven’s family, he would have been guilty of loshon hora, not rechilus. In Be’er Mayim Chaim, the Chofetz Chaim presents a case where one would be permitted to relate the information to non-family members. Reuven and Levi are involved in a monetary disagreement. Levi mentioned to Shimon that he was convinced that he was right and that he would win the forthcoming din Torah (court case). If Shimon were to mention this to someone outside of Reuven’s family, it would not be loshon hora (assuming that nothing derogatory was said about Reuven). However, if repeated to a member of Reuven’s family it would be rechilus, since family members are inclined to be offended by the suggestion that Reuven is wrong.
The Chofetz Chaim then presents a case of a Jew who sets a non-Jew against a Jew. For example: A non-Jew purchased an item from Aharon. David tells the non-Jew, “He overcharged you.” The non-Jew feels cheated and may come to hate Aharon. The Chofetz Chaim sees this type of rechilus as particularly dangerous because it may cause the non-Jew to seek ways to harm Aharon for having taken advantage of him.
The Chofetz Chaim states: “Some people stumble frequently in this matter. They denigrate merchandise which a non-Jew purchased from a Jew, or they find fault with the work which a Jew did for a non-Jew. This can cause the Jew harm, and often can mean the ruination of his livelihood.”
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim gives us two examples of rechilus which are at opposite extremes. The first deals with an am ha’aretz, a Jew who is woefully poor in his knowledge of Torah. The Chofetz Chaim reminds us that the primary prohibition against loshon hora and rechilus is Lo Seileich Rachil B’Amecha, You shall not go as a peddler of gossip among your people (Vayikra 19:16). An am ha’aretz, though ignorant of Torah, is certainly included in Amecha, your people. Thus, it is absolutely forbidden to speak rechilus about him.
The Chofetz Chaim then cautions us very strongly against speaking rechilus about a talmid chacham (Torah scholar). The Chofetz Chaim’s points are explained through the following illustration:
Let us imagine that Chaim tells Yosef: “Rabbi Adams told me that your honesty leaves something to be desired.” Now, as we have already learned, rechilus cannot be related even when it is true. If it is false, the sin is greater. In the case of a talmid chacham, chances are that either the speaker is not reporting the statement correctly — in other words, he’s guilty of falsehood — or that the scholar had good reason for saying what he said.
Furthermore, says the Chofetz Chaim, the Torah commands us to respect and assist Torah scholars. We should eat with them, do business with them, seek to marry our daughters to them, and cling to them in any way possible. A Jew does the opposite when he speaks rechilus concerning a talmid chacham.
Finally, people are especially hurt when they hear that a person of stature spoke badly of them. When Yosef hears that Rabbi Adams said he is dishonest, this will very possibly cause him to feel deep resentment towards the rabbi. If he had looked to the rabbi as his mentor, his religious observance might even be affected.
If Yosef is hot-tempered, the report could lead to a feud. If Rabbi Adams is the rav (rabbi) of the synagogue in which Yosef is a member, such rechilus might ultimately cause the rav to lose his position. Thus, rechilus spoken about a talmid chacham is an extremely serious matter.
The laws of rechilus apply to all Jews. There is no difference whether the speaker is a relative or stranger. And there is no difference whether the person being spoken about is an adult or a child.
Furthermore, a son or daughter who hears someone speak badly of his or her parent cannot relate this to the parent. For example, if a son hears a nasty comment about his father, he cannot tell his father about it. Though he is motivated by a desire to honor his father, he will honor him more by obeying the Torah’s command not to speak rechilus.
As we stated, it is forbidden to speak rechilus about a child. The Chofetz Chaim offers an example which shatters a common misconception:
Shimon’s son is fighting with Levi’s son in the park, and Shimon’s son has the upper hand. Reuven happens to be strolling through the park at that time. He is a good friend of Levi and he knows exactly what to do — at least, he thinks he does.
The next time Reuven meets Levi, he tells him how Shimon’s boy “was giving it” to his son. Levi is not pleased. The next time Levi sees Shimon’s son, he pulls him aside and tells him in no uncertain terms that if he ever goes near his son again he will regret it. To make it clear that “he means business,” Levi slaps the boy on both cheeks.
Shimon’s son now tells his father, who in turn is incensed at Levi. A full-scale feud erupts, and how did it all begin? With the rechilus reported by Reuven.
The Chofetz Chaim is not suggesting that we never inform a parent when his child is the victim of aggression. What he is telling us is that rechilus about children is also rechilus and therefore we need to fulfill all the conditions of toeles (constructive speech) before informing a father of such matters. In our example, Reuven must first ask himself: “Am I certain that my understanding of the incident is correct? Perhaps Levi’s son instigated the fight and teased the other boy until he felt the need to retaliate?
“What will I accomplish by telling Levi about the incident? And if there is something to accomplish, perhaps it could be done by speaking to Shimon about his son, so as to avoid speaking rechilus?” Other questions relating to the conditions of rechilus l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) need to be addressed as well.
In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim introduces us to a particularly deadly strain of gossip, a brand of loshon hora which is instinctively abhorrent to the average Jew. We are referring to the words of a malshin, a Jew who informs on another Jew to government authorities. While such a scenario is very rare, nevertheless, it too is covered by halachah and the Chofetz Chaim saw fit to include it in his sefer. To better understand the issue at hand, we offer a modern-day example.
A certain businessman decides to get rid of his competition the old-fashioned way — he informs on him to the IRS, the Board of Health or some other governmental body. His competitor is now in serious trouble and faces heavy fines which will consume his capital and possibly cause his business to collapse.
The victim has many problems to face. Uppermost in his mind, however, is one question: “Which one of my competitors did this to me?” He investigates a bit and discovers what, to his mind, is strong evidence pointing to one man’s guilt. He decides to give the man a “taste of his own medicine” and informs on him to the authorities.
The Chofetz Chaim explains the seriousness of his error:
“In truth, this is a complete mistake for a number of reasons:
“To inform on the other person would only be permissible if it could accomplish something constructive for the future, so that the perpetrator would not inform on him again — and would be allowed only if there was no other way to accomplish this. However, if his intention in informing on him is revenge, it is absolutely forbidden (as explained in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 388:9).
“Furthermore, to inform on the person (for a constructive purpose) would be allowed if he knows firsthand that this man is the guilty one — for example, he was actually present when the man spoke to the authorities about him. However, circumstantial evidence — even strong evidence — would not permit this. Certainly he could not inform on the alleged informer based on reports which he received from others, for he cannot even believe the reports in his heart, unless they were offered as testimony in beis din (rabbinical court)… One cannot rely on such reports to cause the person even the slightest loss …”
Even in the most difficult situations, the laws of the Torah must be upheld. Those who withstand the test and refrain from accepting rechilus in difficult circumstances will merit reward to which no earthly pleasure can compare.
Both in the laws of loshon hora and the laws of rechilus, the Chofetz Chaim has stressed that someone who intentionally relates negative talk without a constructive purpose is deemed a rasha (wicked individual), for he intentionally transgresses Torah prohibitions, and obviously his words cannot be believed. But what if such remarks were not made maliciously, in the way of a gossipmonger? What if the person conveyed the information Meisiach L’fi Tumo, as a casual remark with no harm intended?
The Chofetz Chaim refers us to the laws of loshon hora (Day 62). There we learned that with regard to those laws, the principle of Meisiach L’fi Tumo carries no weight. Here, too, if someone casually — and seemingly innocently — speaks rechilus in the course of conversation, we are not permitted to believe it. If the speaker’s report could be understood in a favorable way, we are required to give the subject the benefit of the doubt.
Another concept, which we have already discussed, is Devarim Hanicarim (recognizable signs), circumstantial proof which indicates that a report is true. Here, the Chofetz Chaim enumerates the five conditions which must be met before one can accept rechilus as fact based on circumstantial proof:
1. There is no way that the information can be interpreted in a favorable way.
2. The evidence must be directly related to the report and it must be solid, not superficial.
3. The listener has firsthand knowledge of the evidence. If he heard about the evidence from someone else but did not confirm it personally, it cannot be relied upon.
4. As we have stated many times, one may listen to rechilus only for a constructive purpose. If there is no such purpose, it is forbidden to listen to the report, regardless of how convincing the evidence seems. If one heard the report accidentally, he must disregard it.
5. After meeting the above four conditions, one is permitted to accept the information as fact and act upon it constructively. However, he is not permitted to share the information with others (except for a constructive purpose) — including his wife, parents or close friends. And he certainly cannot use the information as an excuse to harm the individual in any way.
Important Numbers
